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The Covid-19 pandemic has presented an extreme challenge to legal and political structures 
around the globe. Institutions are struggling to cope with this new reality, none more 
strenuously than our legal systems which have rapidly introduced and frequently amended 
criminal and other sanctions in the hopes of curbing the spread of the virus. In such 
circumstances, the old adage that desperate times call for desperate measures rings true, 
prompting calls for a loosening or suspension of previously held legal norms. This paper 
explores the role that the concept of an emergency plays in our interpretation of fundamental 
constitutional principles such as the rule of law. 
Emergencies are, ironically, commonplace. Fires break out and road accidents occur on a 
daily basis. Indeed, so frequently that we employ full-time emergency services to respond to 
them. The normalcy of emergencies reveals a descriptive paradox, given that emergencies are 
often defined as abnormal instances demanding extraordinary responses. As Greene puts it, 
“emergencies are simultaneously a universal, inevitable reality but also unforeseen, 
exceptional events invariably requiring equally exceptional responses”.1 If our contention is 
that an emergency is something exceptional, which requires an exceptional response, it 
becomes difficult to see how fires or road accidents qualify. In most cases, there is actually 
not much which is exceptional about an emergency, particularly from the perspective of the 
law. Even large-scale crises such as natural disasters or viral outbreaks can and have been 
addressed within the ordinary confines of existing institutional structures, with, at most, a 
fast-tracked timeline or loosening of some procedural red tape. And yet, these examples do 
often warrant a different response, even if it is not a wholly exceptional one.  
The difficulty then arises as to how emergencies interact with our constitutional norms, 
particularly those relating to the interpretation of legal concepts. Crises such as these force us 
to reconcile the exceptional with the fundamental. If emergencies are to have any legal 
significance such that they might trigger a state of exception, they must amount to more than 
simply natural concepts; they must also be legal concepts, interpreted harmoniously with 
 
1 A Greene, Permanent States of Emergency and the Rule of Law: Constitutions in an Age of 
Crisis (2018) 1. 
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legal and constitutional principle. This paper will argue that, when interpreted through the 
lens of constitutional principle, the above paradox dissolves, leaving a body of coherent and 
flexible norms which need not countenance exceptions precisely because they provide ample 
resources to address unexpected challenges such as international terrorism or the COVID-19 
crisis. Nevertheless, while the principles of the common law can provide flexible guidance in 
crisis situations, this does not mean that appeals to an emergency can necessarily justify 
departures from constitutional fundamentals. Ultimately, the appropriate and justified 
response to an emergency will be determined by reference to competing interpretations of 
constitutional obligation, not by the need to depart from that which is held to be fundamental 
to the legitimacy of governance.  
 
A. DEFINING EMERGENCY 
One thing that unifies different conceptions of emergency is an emphasis on departure from 
the ordinary state of affairs.2 Varieties of emergency arise because there are different 
standards of normalcy. A medical emergency is one which can’t be dealt with by booking an 
appointment with a GP. The kinds of emergency which are interesting for constitutional 
theory are therefore those which are not or cannot be dealt with by the normal legal or 
political responses, be they constitutional convention, judicial interpretation, or regulatory or 
statutory creation. In this context, emergency is invoked as the justification for a departure 
from existing constitutional constraints upon executive or legislative power. International 
terrorism poses such a threat, it is argued, that it justifies denying suspected terrorists the 
right to a fair trial or the capacity to challenge the legality of their detention.3 As Greene 
notes, “[t]he entire purpose of declaring a state of emergency is to enable powers not 
ordinarily permissible under the constraints of the constitution”.4 This is true in other 
emergency contexts too. Ambulances and fire trucks are permitted to depart from the 
ordinary rules of the road and doctors may preform urgent procedures on an unconscious 
patient, even if they might ordinarily be required to obtain consent.  
How then is the exception which allows ambulances to break the speed limit 
meaningfully different from other forms of exception such as diplomatic immunity, the 
 
2 The dichotomy between norms and exceptions has been described as the very “structure of 
emergency powers”: J Ferejohn and P Pasquino, "The Law of the Exception: A Typology of 
Emergency Powers" (2004) 2 I CON 210 at 221. 
3 See A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 68. 
4 Greene (n 1) 19. 
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exemption from criminal liability granted to the legally insane, or the prerogative of mercy? 
These may well be exceptions, but it is not clear that they are emergencies. Emergencies have 
as much to do with the permissibility of otherwise impermissible responses as they have to do 
with particular crises themselves.5 Within domestic constitutional law, many states make 
provision for a whole host of material conditions which might give rise to an emergency 
capable of establishing a state of exception.6 However, this again raises the paradox wherein 
emergencies are incorporated into the law and are thus subject to legal interpretation such 
that executive responses to emergencies become judicially reviewable. To be truly 
exceptional, decisions relating to whether we are in a state of emergency and what is to be 
done about it must be non-justiciable, subject only to the judgement of the executive. 
Nevertheless, there do appear to be some conceptual restraints upon what can 
properly be called an emergency. While the concept must remain somewhat vague so as to 
provide for unforeseen circumstances, perceived or actual urgency is necessary. There must 
be some degree of time-sensitivity. This is what differentiates a car crash from a cancer 
diagnosis, even if cancer might pose a more serious threat to one’s health than the broken 
bones which result from a road accident. It is the urgency with which a response is demanded 
that determines a crisis or emergency. It seems that emergencies are best defined by the 
required character of the response rather than anything about the event or phenomenon that 
engenders it: whether an effective response necessitates a suspension or exemption to law. 
Put another way, concepts such as a threat to the life of the nation are best understood as 
arising not because of objective material conditions which will always produce such a threat, 
but by reference to the actual or perceived inadequacy of existing institutions to achieve the 
end-goal needed in the time-frame demanded. Greene refers to this as a “severity threshold” 
and argues that it “is only crossed when normal responses to the threat are ineffectual”.7 We 
could therefore define constitutional emergencies as those situations where an exception to 
constitutional law is demanded, justified by reference to the real or perceived urgent need to 
depart from constitutional law, and which is therefore not bound by law at all.8  
Theorising states of emergency requires one to first establish if we are dealing with a 
crisis that might warrant an exception and then secondly to decide whether it is acceptable to 
 
5 Ibid 1–2. 
6 Ibid 15-19. 
7 Ibid 2. 
8 For the classic account, see C Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of 
Sovereignty (1985); C Schmitt, Dictatorship (2014). 
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depart from constitutional obligations in such circumstances. Ends which cannot be pursued 
without breaching the rule of law demand justification for the breach, if breach of 
fundamental law is capable of justification at all. One potential justification is emergency. 
Yet, the fact that many crises are accounted for within legal and social frameworks brings the 
paradox of emergencies to the fore once more. To the extent that emergences are legal 
concepts, their meaning and scope must be determined by reference to legal principle, 
interpreted by reference to constitutional fundamentals such as the rule of law. However, it is 
in the nature of constitutional emergencies that they are not bound by or are at least permitted 
to depart from legal constraints, including and perhaps especially the rule of law. This raises 
difficulties both with how we define an emergency and with how this may affect our 
understanding of the state of normalcy. If an emergency constitutes a legal justification for 
breach of constitutional principle, then it ceases to be the case that constitutional law is 
unable to address these matters and so this ceases to be an emergency. What we have instead 
is simply a more nuanced understanding of constitutional obligation.  
It is for this reason that the examples mentioned above relating to ambulances and 
doctors do not breach traffic or medical consent laws: they simply constitute a more nuanced 
aspect of the law which better reflects the application of general principle to the 
particularities of the individual case. It is important to therefore stress that a need for 
expediency or decisive action does not necessarily give rise to a legal emergency. Procedures 
can be put in place which allow for the circumvention of certain procedural requirements. 
However, where the norms sought to be abandoned are in fact fundamental, it is unclear 
whether exceptions can be countenanced at all.  
The paradox of emergencies is therefore two-fold. First, if emergencies are defined as 
exceptions to the ordinary state of affairs which demand extraordinary responses, then the 
institutionalisation of emergency response serves to transform the exceptional into the 
ordinary. Second, if the presence of an emergency justifies the breach of ordinary 
constitutional norms, it cannot be defined by reference to the urgent need to breach 
constitutional norms. All that could be said is that it is permissible to breach constitutional 
norms if there is a sufficient need to do so. In such instances, the normative work is done 
almost entirely by the desirability of the end-goal in view, raising the question how we are to 
distinguish ends which might justify an alteration of constitutional norms from those which 
cannot. Of course, from one perspective, this can never be countenanced. The constitution is 
supposed to set out the bounds of legitimate governmental action. It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to conceive of legitimate exceptions to principles which set the boundaries of 
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legitimacy. It is less clear still how one should describe situations where rigid interpretations 
of certain legal rules are challenged by reference to our existing constitutional values and 
principles.  
 
B. THE EXCEPTIONAL AND THE FUNDAMENTAL 
Emergencies present an interesting problem when they are used to depart from hitherto 
fundamental principles. It is one thing for a medical crisis to justify an ambulance breaking 
the speed-limit. It is another thing entirely for a medical crisis to allow a doctor to murder a 
patient. And yet, we can imagine instances where a commitment to the value of life or health 
might present just such a dilemma. Consider the following hypothetical posed by philosopher 
Judith Jarvis Thomson:  
 
you are to imagine yourself to be a surgeon, a truly great surgeon. Among other things 
you do, you transplant organs, and you are such a great surgeon that the organs you 
transplant always take. At the moment you have five patients who need organs. … If 
they do not get those organs today, they will all die; if you find organs for them today, 
you can transplant the organs and they will all live. … The time is almost up when a 
report is brought to you that a young man who has just come into your clinic for his 
yearly check-up has exactly the right blood-type, and is in excellent health. Lo, you 
have a possible donor. All you need do is cut him up and distribute his parts among 
the five who need them. You ask, but he says, "Sorry. I deeply sympathize, but no." 
Would it be morally permissible for you to operate anyway?9 
 
Most people, I suggest, would be inclined to say no. For certain, such conduct would be 
unlawful. And yet, if this were an emergency, the unlawfulness of the conduct is perhaps not 
a bar on action. Presuming, for the moment, that it is permissible for the ambulance driver to 
speed in certain circumstances but that the doctor is not justified in killing one patient to save 
five, we are left with the difficulty of explaining why. Once we have done that, we may be in 
a better position to determine whether the invocation of emergency to justify departure from 
the rule of law is more like the ambulance driver who breaks the speed limit or the doctor 
who kills one patient to save five. Put another way, we must determine whether the rule of 
 
9 JJ Thomson, "The Trolley Problem" (1985) 94 Yale Law Journal 1395 at 1396. 
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law sets the boundaries of constitutional legitimacy or whether it is instead merely one 
principle among many, to be infringed when circumstances demand.10 
 In both of the examples mentioned above, there is an appeal to a higher order 
normative value to justify a breach of rules which are themselves informed and justified by 
that same value. What then distinguishes the ambulance driver from the murderous doctor? 
One suggestion is that what matters is whether moral and legal rights have been violated in 
the pursuit of a desirable end, even if that end is itself informed by fundamental values. 
Ambulance drivers, in the discharge of their duties, are permitted to speed. They are not 
permitted to run over pedestrians, even if mounting the curb would be a quicker method of 
reaching their destination. This is because exposing others to increased risk arguably does not 
violate any of their rights in itself.11  
Constitutional law is not utilitarian or purely consequentialist: legal principles operate 
as deontic constraints upon the actions of public officials in their pursuit of the common 
good, embodied in duties and correlatively entailed rights that public officials must respect. 
These constraints are informed by our conception of what constitutes a “constitution”; just as 
the constraints placed upon medical professionals are informed by our understanding of what 
it means to be a doctor and not a butcher. Ultimately, whether the actions of a doctor or 
paramedic are justified is determined by whether they can be properly called medical care, 
not whether it is permissible to breach the obligations that a doctor owes to her patient. This 
reveals the importance of appropriate, principled interpretation for determining what must be 
done in a given situation. The doctor must look to the internal standards of their profession to 
determine whether they are justified in departing from a given rule during a crises. Likewise, 
a court charged with assessing the lawfulness of executive action during a crisis must be 
guided by a sufficiently nuanced interpretation of legal principle, grounded within the values 
of the legal order itself.  
 It is therefore not possible to separate questions of legality from questions of 
justification without the judiciary endangering the separation of powers. Yet, this is exactly 
what the New Zealand High Court seemed to do in Borrowdale v Director General of Health, 
holding that the confinement of people to their homes for a nine-day period was justified but 
unlawful.12 The confinement itself was without legal basis and so was contrary to section 5 of 
 
10 See J Raz, "The Rule of Law and Its Virtue", in The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and 
Morality (2009) 2010. 
11 See JJ Thomson, Rights, Restitution and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory (1986). 
12 [2020] NZHC 2090.  
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the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. Nevertheless, the court chose to separate the question of 
justification from that of legality, concluding that confinement was a necessary, reasonable 
and proportionate response to the Covid-19 crisis, notwithstanding its unlawfulness. This 
raises some important questions: if the confinement was not legally justified, in what other 
way is it justified and is the court acting improperly by commenting on non-legal forms of 
justification?  
 When a court of law holds that the actions of public officials are unlawful but 
justified, even if only in an official press summary, it clearly is not declaring the conduct in 
question to be legally justified: it can only mean that, illegality notwithstanding, the public 
official acted in a manner which is politically or morally justified. This undermines the 
political independence of the judiciary, even if the assessment of justification was done by 
reference to existing standards of rationality and proportionality. From the perspective of the 
common law, actions taken by public officials which have no legal basis are necessarily and 
always unreasonable and disproportionate. If concepts such as reasonableness, 
proportionality, or even emergency are to have any legal significance then they must become 
juridical, judicially enforceable concepts: no legal concept can be properly understood 
without recourse to our existing body of principles and the institutional history wherein those 
principles have been expounded and shaped through time. Their meaning is the product of 
artificial reason and a court, if it is to interpret the law and not opine on abstract political or 
moral issues, must ground its analysis within the practice itself. Of course, political reality 
and context will often be relevant for determining the legality of official action. However, it 
is one thing to account for this reality when assessing the lawfulness of a particular act or 
policy; it is another thing entirely to artificially separate questions of legality from those of 
justification. From the perspective of the court and the rule of law, unlawful conduct on the 
part of legal officials is simply not capable of legal justification.  
 
C. CONCLUSION 
While it would breach the separation of powers for the judiciary to enter into the realm of 
political morality, unmoored from their interpretive function, this does not mean that 
constitutional theorists must also be so confined. In times of crisis, it may be the case that the 
law is incapable of providing an appropriate response in the necessary timeframe. In these 
situations, we might say that governmental action is indeed unlawful but justified by 
reference to the emergency. However, there then emerges the difficult task of determining 
how a court is to assess the permissibility of a given departure from law.  
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Disagreements about the appropriate legal response to international terrorism or the 
current pandemic reveal deep and enduring disagreement concerning the nature and 
justification of constitutionalism itself - questions relating to the very basis on which state 
legitimacy is maintained. On one reading, it is precisely the virtue of strong executive power 
that it can act in the public interest, unmoored from legal constraint when circumstances 
demand. When extraordinary events fundamentally alter the normative landscape, adherence 
to existing legal standards can frustrate measures designed to address the urgent concerns 
which led to this state of crisis in the first place.13 Indeed, it is argued that constitutional 
principles are themselves grounded within the state’s obligation to serve the public interest 
and that this ultimately justifies any temporary departure from the rule of law, should the 
need be great enough. This raises the question whether constitutionalism is best conceived as 
a matter of law or a matter of politics.14 We must ask whether legal principles, developed by 
the common law, partly designed to constrain executive power, themselves exhaust 
constitutional obligation or if there might be a higher order, non-legal obligation on the 
executive to abandon legal constraints in certain circumstances? 
A question of constitutional justification must then be answered separately from the 
question of lawfulness if our conception of constitutionalism extends beyond legal principle. 
If no derogation from legal principle can be countenanced, then the debate becomes an 
internal, interpretive one regarding whether the response to given circumstances is lawful. Of 
course, if that is the case, then we are not in a state of exception – our constitutional law in 
fact does have the resources to address the crisis in question, one way or another. If 
constitutionalism can include political as distinct from legal principles, it may be the case that 
a departure from constitutional law can be justified by reference to political principle, if it is 
possible to sharply delineate political principles from legal principles.  
The concept of a constitutional emergency is thus either an affront to the constitution 
because it attempts to justify breaches of the rule of law, or it is precisely what is required by 
the ideal of constitutionalism, where constitutionalism only contingently requires adherence 
to the rule of law. In neither case is the legitimate approach one that is dethatched from our 
interpretation of constitutional principle. If constitutionalism is defined by reference to a state 
obligation to pursue specific ends or promote certain goods, then constraints of principle can 
be justifiably departed from in circumstances where these very principles hinder the 
 
13 Schmitt, Dictatorship (n 8); Schmitt, Political Theology (n 8).   
14 See Martin Loughlin, Political Jurisprudence (2017); Schmitt, Political Theology (n 8). 
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achievement of constitutionalism’s true aims. However, at least for the common law 
constitution, embodied in deontic principles of legality and legitimacy, there is always a 
correct and appropriate legal answer to a given question, no matter how urgent a response is 
demanded and no matter how great the need may seem to abandon our principles. On this 
conception of constitutionalism, there are no gaps where the law runs out or is unable to 
provide an appropriate response to a crisis. A court, tasked with interpreting constitutional 
principle in times of crisis, has all the resources it could need within the practice itself. Once 
the constitution is conceived as a collection of fundamental principles, there is no room for 
exceptions. But nor is there a need for them.  
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